A shocking revelation has emerged, leaving many questioning the actions of the Pentagon. The defense of the nation's secrets was seemingly compromised, yet no routine investigation was conducted.
The Pentagon's lack of action regarding Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's disclosure of sensitive military information on Signal has sparked controversy. Multiple sources familiar with the matter reveal that no routine investigation was initiated, despite the potential threat to national security. This is particularly concerning as Hegseth's disclosure could have compromised sources, methods, and ongoing military operations.
But here's where it gets controversial... Hegseth, instead of taking responsibility, chose to investigate suspected leakers on his own staff. He even threatened to polygraph defense officials, creating a culture of fear among DoD personnel. This internal focus diverted attention from the potential damage caused by the disclosure.
An internal watchdog report recently concluded that Hegseth's actions endangered American troops in Yemen. Yet, the Pentagon still refuses to conduct a damage assessment or internal classification review. Sources suggest that a separate assessment was expected to establish the full implications of the Signal disclosure, given the limited scope of the IG's probe.
"A breach like this demands a thorough damage assessment," emphasized a former senior defense official. "It's a matter of national security."
The Pentagon's decision not to investigate further, even after the IG's findings, raises serious concerns. Hegseth's claims of "total exoneration" and "no classified information" are misleading, as the watchdog's investigation was limited in scope due to non-cooperation.
Brianna Rosen, a former White House official, clarifies that a damage assessment focuses on risk, not personal culpability. She states, "Even without cooperation, analysts can evaluate the shared material's impact."
However, a senior Pentagon official's statement that no damage assessment was needed because no classified info was shared contradicts the opinions of other current and former officials.
Irvin McCullough, director of national security at the Government Accountability Project, explains that inspectors general typically don't determine classified material compromise. Usually, this is done through a damage assessment by the department's security officers.
McCullough adds, "A damage assessment is standard procedure in such cases."
The US official further explains that a damage assessment for Hegseth's Signal use would have examined the information's transmission, its classification level, and the potential risks.
Despite concerns raised about the safety of US troops and mission objectives, US intelligence agencies and the FBI did not examine the broader national security implications of Hegseth's actions. No assessment was conducted after revelations of his use of Signal to share sensitive attack plans.
Multiple US officials found this unusual, especially given the Pentagon inspector general's determination that the information Hegseth shared was classified at the time.
Former national security prosecutors told CNN that previous administrations would likely have investigated Hegseth's use of Signal for other sensitive discussions.
However, a third former senior defense official noted that the decision to conduct a damage assessment is not automatic and varies across cases.
"The decision hinges on the extent of classified info exposure, potential intelligence value for adversaries, and systemic vulnerabilities," Rosen explained.
US intelligence agencies believed it was the Defense Department's responsibility to initiate a damage assessment, as the Pentagon was in charge of the operation and the details seemed to come from classified military channels. They also believed no classified information of their own was disclosed.
As a result, the intelligence community waited for a request to support the Pentagon's review, which never came.
The IG report acknowledged Hegseth's broad authority to declassify information but noted the lack of documentation showing he properly did so in this case. To declassify, Hegseth would have had to issue a formal written order to top Pentagon officials, which he failed to do.
Unlike the IG, Pentagon officials conducting a damage assessment could have examined Hegseth's actions without relying solely on his cooperation.
In similar cases, damage assessments have led to criminal prosecutions, such as the investigation into former national security adviser John Bolton's handling of classified information.
The question remains: Why was no damage assessment conducted in this case? And what does this mean for national security? These are questions that deserve further discussion and scrutiny.
